Simulation of urban retailers’ freight provision through an Agent-Based Model: the case of Turin

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OUTLINE OF THE PRESENTATION

- Research framework
- Aim and research questions
- Methodology: ABM model
- Data: input and output of the model
- Tested policies and simulation scenarios
- Results of the simulation
- Conclusions
Research Framework

- Contribution to the European project (first call Horizon 2020; duration: June 2015-May 2018) NOVELOG - New cOoperatiVe business modElS and guidance for sustainable city LOGistics (http://novelog.eu/)

- Aim of NOVELOG: “NOVELOG will support the choice of the most optimal and applicable solution for urban freight and service transport, and will facilitate stakeholder collaboration and the development, field testing and transfer of best governance and business models”

- Agent-Based Model (ABM) is one of the assessment tools proposed to estimate the city logistics measures tested by NOVELOG pilot and case studies (municipality of Turin is one of the 12 pilot cities)
RESEARCH FRAMEWORK

- 28 partners and 12 case studies/pilots in different European countries
AIM AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

AIM: to simulate the retailers’ behaviour during the freight provision process, in order to test the effectiveness of some sustainable transport policies that can be applied by the city of Turin.

RQ 1 which mechanisms have stronger influence on the retailers’ decision-making process about ecological or non-ecological behavior for goods supply?

RQ 2 to what extent NOVELOG-based policies implemented by the city of Turin may foster more ecological behaviors of retailers during the process of freight provision?
METHODOLOGY: ABM

What is an Agent-Based Model (ABM)? A simulation tool able to analyze a complex environment, such as the urban freight, through the design of the features of each system component and the interactions among them.

Why an ABM? Advantages:

- Capability to consider high heterogeneity of agents (in terms of features, objectives, location, ...)
- Possibility to simulate feedback dynamics between agents and the events (representing social network)
- Capability to observe the over time dynamics of the process and the differences between particular time steps (emerging properties estimation)
- Bottom-up approach: from the interactions of agents at individual level it is possible to observe the emergent properties of the whole system
- Strong flexibility (simulation of different policies in different contexts)
- Both ex ante or ex post evaluation tool of the impact of policies
- Low cost tool: software open-source, possibility to use virtual data
LITERATURE REVIEW


- Few works focus on urban mobility: more on passenger transport than on freight transport
- Authors agree on the validity of ABM to simulate the complexity of urban mobility, trying to consider the single components as a part of a whole system
- Some ABMs test policies that improve services (e.g.: local public transport services); others test policies that provide incentives for the agents to modify their behaviour
## LITERATURE REVIEW: ABMs AND FREIGHT URBAN TRANSPORT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Intention of the model</th>
<th>Type of variables and/or agents</th>
<th>Geographic dimension</th>
<th>Calibrated on actual data</th>
<th>Time horizon</th>
<th>Structure</th>
<th>Attitude</th>
<th>Maturity level</th>
<th>Type of Experiment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taniguchi and Tamagawa 2005</td>
<td>Evaluation of city logistics measures impacts on the stakeholders behaviour</td>
<td>Administrators; Residents; Shippers; Freight carriers; Urban expressway operators</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Strategic</td>
<td>Dynamic</td>
<td>Both</td>
<td>Simulation experiment</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Donnelly 2007</td>
<td>Urban freight demand estimation and supply design</td>
<td>Economic drivers; Modal alternatives; Trans-shipment; Exports &amp; Imports, Shipment generation, Destination choice, Carrier and vehicle choice, Tour optimization</td>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Strategic &amp; operational</td>
<td>Static</td>
<td>Field experiment</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Tamagawa et al. 2010</td>
<td>Model for vehicle routing and scheduling problem with time window-forecasted</td>
<td>5 kinds of actors with different objectives on a test urban road network: Freight carriers; Shippers; Residents; Administrators; Motorway operators</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Strategic</td>
<td>Dynamic</td>
<td>Both</td>
<td>Simulation experiment</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Roorda et al. 2010</td>
<td>Development of a framework for a description of actor heterogeneity and interaction in freight system</td>
<td>Business establishments, firms and facilities; commodity production and business service facilities; logistics service facilities; End consumers Contracts; Commodity contracts; Business service contract; Logistics service contract; Shipments Time</td>
<td>Toronto Area</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Strategic</td>
<td>Dynamic</td>
<td>Both</td>
<td>Conceptual proposal</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Anand et al. 2012</td>
<td>Design of an ontology</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Strategic</td>
<td>Dynamic</td>
<td>Both</td>
<td>Conceptual proposal</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Van Duin et al. 2012</td>
<td>Investigation on the impact of policy measures for the success or urban distribution centres</td>
<td>Trucks and freight carriers; one type of goods; UDC operator; Retailers; Municipality; Road network</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Strategic</td>
<td>Dynamic</td>
<td>Both</td>
<td>Simulation experiment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teo et al. 2014</td>
<td>Evaluation of the carriers’ profit and cost, shippers’ cost, distance travelled by trucks, n. of trucks, n. of Osaka road network</td>
<td>OSaka road network</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td>Strategic and operational</td>
<td>Dynamic</td>
<td>Both</td>
<td>Simulation experiment</td>
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OUR MODEL: ABM-TO

- **What is ABM-TO?** An agent-based simulation (based on the open-source software NetLogo) of retailers’ dynamics in freight transport provision within the Limited Traffic Zone in Turin ⇒ ecological or non-ecological behavior?

- **Ecological behaviour**: use of own-account transport with low pollutant vehicle (Euro 5 or electric or hybrid) or use of third-party transport providers

- **Non-ecological behaviour**: use of own-account transport with high pollutant vehicle.
OUR MODEL: ABM-TO

- **Assumption**: agents’ incentives for behavioural change from non-ecological to ecological behaviour are based on
  1. personal motivation for environmental issues;
  2. comparison of perceived service quality and its price;
  3. network influence (imitation).

- A non-spatial **network structure** acts as a proxy of the social relations within the domain of the working and community context.
INPUT: EMPIRICAL DATA

- 762 agents (30% of the 2,542 retailers in Turin LTZ)
- Vehicles crossing the entry points of the LTZ of Turin within 10 days in 2013: vehicle Euro class, own-account or third-party transport
- Commercial activities within the LTZ in Turin: commodity sector, location and size
- $PM_{10}$ emissions of different Euroclass commercial vehicles
OUTPUT

- Timing of the diffusion of virtuous behaviors as effect of policies applied by the City of Turin («diffusion process» by Bass, 1969)
- PM$_{10}$ decrease
**Tested Policies**

- **“Pull” approach** ⇒ policies that incentivize proactive attitudes by the beneficiaries, instead of punishing the rules’ violation.

- **2 policies:**
  1. **Price policy**: indirect incentive to retailers (a permit that reduces the cost of freight provision) to shift from the non-ecological group to the ecological one:
     
     Examples of benefits from NOVELOG permit: an extended time-windows to access in LTZ, use of dedicated bus lanes and loading/unloading areas within pedestrian zones
  2. **Motivation policy**: intervention on the agent intrinsic motivation for ecological behaviour (+ 10%) and on the desire to increase its reputation within the network (Fowler and Christakis 2010). Examples: educational campaign, eco-labeling.
SIMULATION SCENARIOS

4 scenarios, with and without the motivation policy

1. **Starting scenario**: no price-policy
2. **Soft own-account price policy**: light decrease of the price of own-account transport with low pollutant vehicle (OAE) and very low decrease of third-party solution price (TP)
3. **Strong own-account price policy**: consistent decrease of the price of own-account transport with low pollutant vehicle (OAE) very low decrease of third-party solution price (TP)
4. **Third-party price policy**: consistent decrease of the price of use of third-party transport option (TP) and very low decrease of the price of own-account transport with low pollutant vehicle (OAE)
The model calculates for each scenario the unit of time needed to increase of 20% the n. of adopters (agents shifting from non-ecological behaviour to ecological one)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>Price levels</th>
<th>Initial share of adopters of ecological behavior (PM10 g/km)</th>
<th>Unit of time to reach +20% adopters (only price policies)</th>
<th>Time reduction (only price policies)</th>
<th>Unit of time needed to reach +20% adopters (price policy + motivation policy)</th>
<th>Time reduction (price policy + motivation policy)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. No policy</td>
<td>TP: 2.5</td>
<td>57% (22)</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OAE: 5</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OANE: 3.5</td>
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<td>2. Soft own-account policy</td>
<td>TP: 2.3</td>
<td>55% (23.43)</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>-7.1%</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>-9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OAE: 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OANE: 3.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Strong own-account policy</td>
<td>TP: 2.3</td>
<td>59% (21)</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>-14%</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>-9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OAE: 2</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OANE: 3.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Third-party policy</td>
<td>TP: 1.5</td>
<td>60% (20.18)</td>
<td>1.68</td>
<td>-8.19%</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>-14.28%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OAE: 4.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OANE: 3.5</td>
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Agents progressively shift from non ecological to ecological behaviours

The time for behavioural change and the consequent PM$_{10}$ reduction differ according to the type and intensity of policy

In all the scenarios the environmental emissions always decrease by about 34% (from about 20-22 to 14.52 PM10 g/km)

Decrease of PM10 emissions (g/km) during the simulation
CONCLUSIONS

- In absence of motivation policy, agents react better to a policy that provides strong incentives to shift to a more ecological vehicle within the own-account option (scenario 3)
- In case of combination of price and motivation policies, the best results are given by a policy that provides incentives to the shift to third-party transport (scenario 4)
- Soft incentives for more ecological vehicles in own-account transport are more effective overtime than as initial shock and in combination with motivation policy (scenario 2)
- The simulation confirm the findings of the literature on reputation effects (Milinski et al., 2002; Fowler and Christakis 2010): results come from the balance between the price policy effect and the network influence effect that is related to motivation policy
- **Further research**: To integrate the model with GIS tool, reproducing the real spatial network and to introduce the real time unit
THANK YOU FOR THE ATTENTION!

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